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ABSTRACT 
 
The President and Premiers in South Africa appoint and dismiss Senior Members of 
the Executive on a national and provincial level such as Ministers, Deputy Ministers 
and Members of Executive. This is a constitutional prerogative that the President and 
Premiers hold. Therefore the Senior Members of the Executive are vulnerable in a 
sense that they could be without a job tomorrow as it is the President’s and Premiers’ 
prerogative to appoint and dismiss them as they deem fit. Therefore typically these 
Senior Members of the Executive do not necessarily enjoy any protection against 
unfair dismissals in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The President and Premiers’ 
decisions in this regard are an executive and constitutional function and therefore 
these decisions are not subject to judicial review under the Promotion of 
Administration Justice Act 3 of 2000.  However at common law we have the doctrine 
of legality, which implies that executive decisions must be rational, otherwise those 
decisions are subject to judicial review. Therefore the decisions of the President and 
Premiers to appoint and dismiss these Senior Members of the Executive must not be 
arbitrary.  
 
In essence, this dissertation aims to highlight and investigate the vulnerability of 
Senior Members of the Executive, as they do not afford any protection against unfair 
dismissals under the Labour Relations Act. This dissertation will also weigh up two 
conflicting constitutional rights. Furthermore this dissertation will provide 
recommendations on how to solve the issue of Senior Members of the Executive 
being vulnerable to dismissal without recourse.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Executive at national level consists of the President, Deputy President and the 
Cabinet Ministers. The Executive at provincial level consists of Premiers and 
Members of the Executive Council. It is the responsibility of the Executive to run 
the country and make policies in line with the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa,1 (hereon referred to as the Constitution) which are beneficial to its 
citizens.2 Section 91(2) of the Constitution gives the President a constitutional 
right to appoint and dismiss Ministers and Deputy Ministers. Similarly, the 
Constitution gives the Premier of every province in the country the constitutional 
right to appoint and dismiss a maximum of ten Members of the Executive 
Council. Therefore these powers that the President and Premiers have could result 
in a situation where Members of the Executive are left without a job at any given 
time because it is a decision the President and Premiers can make at any given 
time.  
 
 
The President’s decision is an executive and constitutional function, which is not 
subject to judicial review under PAJA. However our courts have held that 
executive decisions must be rational. The same way decisions made by Ministers 
must be rational is the same way decisions made by the President or Premiers 
must be rational.3 This is known as the common law doctrine of legality. The 
doctrine of legality implies that executive decisions must be rational; otherwise 
those decisions are subject to judicial review.  
 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to fair labour 
practices. The rest of the subsections refer to “workers”, “employers”, 
“employers’ organisations” and “trade unions” specifically. In the case of Wyeth 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele and Others, 4  the court held that the LRA must be 
construed to give effect to the Constitution. 5  The Constitution and labour 
legislation seek to redress the power imbalance between employers and 
employees in the country. However in terms of the LRA, only “employees” are 
protected whereas in terms of the Constitution, “everyone” is protected as 
“everyone” has the right to fair labour practices. Therefore in order for one to get 
protection under the LRA against an unfair dismissal, one would have to fall 
under the definition of an employee as set out by this Act. Therefore one could 
                                                             
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Parliamentary Monitoring Group “Structure of Government” https://pmg.org.za/pahe/structure-of-
government (22-06-2018). 
3 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
4 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele and Others (JA50/03) [2005] ZALAC 1 (23 March 2005). 
5 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele and Others (n 4). 
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argue that Members of the Executive do fall under the definition of an “employee” 
under the LRA and therefore enjoy protection against unfair dismissals. However 
the reality is that in practice, Members of the Executive do not enjoy any 
protection against unfair dismissals under the LRA. Their dismissal could even be 
due to a cabinet reshuffle. A cabinet reshuffle is when the President or Premiers 
make changes to the composition of MECs. This however results in the 
infringement of the section 23 right to fair labour practices, which a Member of 
the Executive is entitled to. The President’s and Premier’s constitutional right to 
dismiss these members surely cannot trump these members’ constitutional right to 
fair labour practices. Therefore I will further investigate this in this dissertation.  
 
 
The focus of this dissertation will be on the Members of the Executive at national 
and provincial level. These members are in a very compromised position as they 
could be dismissed at any moment because it is the constitutional prerogative of 
the President and the Premier to do so. This dissertation will also be looking at the 
common law rationality element that comes to play when reviewing these 
decisions. The writer will also be looking at the conflicting constitutional 
prerogative that arises in this case. Furthermore the writer will also give 
recommendations on how to solve the issue of Members of the Executive being 
vulnerable to dismissals without recourse. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
The main purpose of this study is to highlight the vulnerability of Senior Members 
of the Executive when it comes to unfair dismissals in terms of the LRA. The 
reality is that these Members of the Executive are not afforded protection under 
the LRA because of the President and Premier’s constitutional prerogative to 
appoint and dismiss these Members as they deem fit.  
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CHAPTER 2: SOUTH AFRICAN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
2.1 Brief overview of the South African Executive authority 
There are three spheres of government that currently exist in South Africa, namely the 
Executive, Judicial and Legislative sphere. These spheres of government are 
independent of each other. The doctrine of separation of powers is implicit in the 
Constitution in order to prevent the concentration of power in one branch of 
government while at the same time preventing the branches of government from 
usurping power from one another. 6 Thus it also prevents excessive powers being 
vested in the presidency.7 The Constitutional Court held that there “can be no doubt 
that our Constitution provides for such a separation of powers, and that laws 
inconsistent with what the Constitution requires in that regard are invalid.” 8  The 
Executive authority, which is the focal point of this dissertation, has the power to 
execute and enforce the law.9 The responsibility of the Executive is to run the country 
and make policies that are in the best interests of South African citizens. The 
Executive is the dominant branch of government almost everywhere globally and its 
authority increases uncompromisingly.10 
 
The Executive at a national level consists of the President, Deputy President and 
Cabinet Ministers. The President is Head of State and Head of the National Executive 
or cabinet. He or she is entrusted with maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution 
as the guiding law of the country, and is also required to promote the unity and 
interests of the nation. One of the responsibilities of the President is to appoint the 
cabinet and the Deputy President. The President assigns powers and functions to the 
Minister and may dismiss them. This is seen as the prerogative of the President to 
appoint and dismiss Ministers as he deems fit, which is said to constitute an executive 
action. Each Minister has a ministry, which consists of a small team of advisors. 
There are twenty-eight portfolios in total at present. Examples of departments are 
Defence, Finance, Home Affairs and Intelligence.11Section 96(1) of the Constitution12 
stipulates that MECs on a national level must act in accordance to a code of ethics 
prescribed by national legislation 
 
The South African Constitution is very clear that the President does not have to 
consult anyone in appointing his team and therefore there is no breach of the supreme 
                                                             
6 Sewpersadh and Mubangizi “Judicial review of administrative and executive decisions: overreach activism 
or pragmatism?” 2017 Law Democracy & Development 201 202. 
7 Butler “The state of the South African presidency” 2013 The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation 4 4. 
8 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC). 
9 Mojapelo “The doctrine of separation of powers (a South African perspective)” 2013 Frorum 37 37. 
10 Butler (n 7) 5. 
11 n 2 above. 
12 n 1 above. 
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law.13 This was seen during the Presidency terms of Jacob Zuma where he dismissed 
the Finance Minister who was Nhlanhla Nene at the time and replaced him with Des 
Van Rooyen. This decision was seen as a reckless decision, which had an adverse 
affect on the country’s economy and therefore breaching the President’s oath of 
office.14 The President when taking the oath of office swore “to promote all that will 
advance the Republic, and to oppose all that may harm it and to devote himself to the 
wellbeing of the Republic and all of its people”.15 This shows that the decisions taken 
by a President to appoint and dismiss Ministers must always be in line with the oath 
of office he or she took. This meaning that all decisions must never be to the 
detriment of the country. Furthermore in the Presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa in 2019, 
a cabinet reshuffle left many Ministers without a job. The reason being that some 
ministries have been combined and some new people were appointed. An example is 
former Minister Jeff Radebe, who is now replaced by Minister Gwede Mantashe. 
However one can find consolation in the manner President Cyril Ramaphosa elected 
his cabinet. He mentioned that he took a few considerations into account. These 
include experience, continuity, competence, a generational mix, a demographic mix 
and regional diversity.16 However for the purposes of this dissertation, it is important 
to note that the allegations regarding the President or Premiers dismissing MECs are 
untested allegations. However it speaks to the ease of dismissals, as there is no need 
for any reasons to be given for such decisions.  
 
The Executive in each province is called the Executive Council and is headed by the 
Premier. Section 125(1) of the Constitution,17 sets out that the executive authority of a 
province is vested in the Premier. The Premier appoints and dismisses the Members 
of the Executive Councils. Section 132 (2) of the Constitution sets out that the 
Premier also assigns powers to these Members of the Executive Council. There are 
approximately ten MECs in each province. MECs are accountable to their Premiers.18 
Like Ministers, MECs are responsible for departments at a provincial level.19  
 
The Premier’s prerogative to appoint and dismiss MECs on a provincial level is also 
absolute in the sense that the Premier when appointing or dismissing MECs, does not 
have to consult any other party about his or her decisions. The decision to appoint or 
                                                             
13 Muthambi “President Jacob Zuma exercised his constitutional prerogative when he dismissed ministers” 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/faith-muthambi/president-jacob-zuma-exercised-his-constitutional-
prerogative-wh_a_22028518/ (22-09-2018). 
14 FW de Klerk Foundation “Statement: the dismissal of minister Nhlanhla Nene” 
http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/latest/news/488-statement-the-dismisal-of-minister-nanhla-ne 
(26-10-2018). 
15 n 14 above. 
16 Sowetan “Cyril Ramaphosa’s new cabinet, in his own words” 
https://www.google.co.za/amp/s/ewn.co.za/2019/05/30/ramaphosa-s-cabinet-who-s-in-who-s-out/amp (30-05-
2019). 
17 n 1 above. 
18  n 1 above. 
19 n 2 above.  
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dismiss is one the Premier makes when and as he deems fit. This was seen in 2012, 
when the Limpopo Premier then named Cassel Mathale had a second cabinet 
reshuffle, which was alleged to be due to a political agenda. 20  He dismissed the 
MECS of the Health and Social Development Department, Sports, Arts and Culture 
Department and lastly the Safety, Security and Liaison Department. The reasoning the 
Premier gave for his decision is that it was aimed to better service delivery and that he 
was of the view that it was in the best interest of South African citizens that the 
abovementioned MECs were dismissed.21 Therefore the result of this decision is that 
the MECs were left unemployed as soon as this decision was made. Kruger in his 
article, points out that the view of presiding officer in the Masethla case, is that the 
exercise of executive powers was limited by the legality principle and the rationality 
requirement.22Therefore there should be a limit to the prerogative the Premier has. 
This limitation would thus be for the benefit and protection of MECs against unfair 
dismissals.  
 
Furthermore the decision the Premier makes to dismiss can be considered to be an 
execution of a political agenda as was the case with Ace Magashule and Mxolisi 
Dukwana. Mxolisi was someone high up in the Free State African National Congress 
structures that Ace trusted a lot. Ace used to be a Premier in the Free State and 
Mxolisi served under him. Mxolisi was dismissed because he refused to work with the 
Gupta family. He was to be in charge of a massive multi-billion rand IT development 
in Welkom, Free State. This never materialized because Mxolisi refused to be a part 
of it. Upon meeting with the Guptas, he was offered R2million per month for ten 
years. He refused to be a part of it and he was then dismissed.23 Mxolisi also thinks 
part of the reason he was dismissed is because he was contesting for the position of 
chairperson of the ANC, which was held by Ace at that time.24 This shows how much 
of the decisions the Premier makes is in line with his or her political agenda. This is 
unfair to the MECs that are left in a vulnerable position. In the abovementioned 
example, Mxolisi’s only crime was not wanting to be part of a deal he classified as  
corruption.  
 
                                                             
20 Rampedi “Mathale’s cabinet reshuffle: retaliation for Julius Malema? 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mathales-cabinet-reshuffle-retaliation-for-julius-malema-1258817 
(18-03-2019). 
21 n 20 above. 
22 Kruger “The South African constitutional court and the rule of law: the Masethla judgment, a cause for 
concern?” 2010 PER 468 472. 
23 Cowan “#Guptasleaks: Ace Magashule, Mxolisi Dukwana and the R2m bribe” 
https:m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/guptaleaks-ace-magashule-mxolisi-dukwana-and-the-r2m-gupta-
bribe-20190405 (15-04-2019). 
24 Mahlati “Magashule fired Dukwana for refusing Guptas’ agenda, Zondo commission hears” 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/magashule-fired-dukwana…refusing-guptas-agenda-zondo-
commission-hears-206698020 (15-04-2019). 
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Therefore from the abovementioned discussion on the decision to appoint and dismiss 
MECs, one can deduce that this may in some cases be a political decision made by the 
President or Premier. As is the case in any democracy, many different political 
considerations would influence decisions about cabinet appointments. Unsupported 
decisions made by the President or the Premiers could however be a political risk for 
him or her. There are many considerations a President or Premier has to have when 
making this decision.25 However, ultimately decisions made should be in line with the 
Constitution.  
 
The Ghanaian Constitution sets out the public officials and their respective powers. It 
further provides for three spheres of authority namely the Legislative, Executive and 
the Judiciary.26 The President is the head of the Executive sphere.27 The President in 
Ghana also appoints and dismisses the Ministers as he deems fit. Therefore it is the 
President’s prerogative to appoint and dismiss as is the case in South Africa. This is 
further seen by how in 2018, the President due to a power deal dismissed the Ghana 
Energy Minister at that time. He then appointed the Land and Natural Resources 
Minister to monitor the ministry in an ‘acting capacity’.28 The structure of governance 
in Australia is set out in the Australian Constitution and is also divided into three 
spheres of authority. 29  The Executive consists of the Queen and Ministers who 
represent the Queen. The Legislative and Executive sphere are made up of the Queen 
and her representatives.30 The Governor-General as the representative of the Queen 
appoints and dismisses the Ministers and Prime Minister.31 This is different to the 
position in South Africa where the President and Premiers are the ones to dismiss the 
MECs. The President and Premiers in South Africa form part of the Executive. In 
Australia, the Ministers form part of the Executive level and the Governor-General 
forms part of the Legislative level. The Australian Executive system is not one South 
Africa can adopt as too much power is vested in the Queen.  
 
2.2 Judicial review of executive decisions 
There are certain checks and balances in place today that exist due to our 
constitutional dispensation. The Constitution regulates the exercise of public power in 
numerous ways. These include the application of the Bill of Rights and other specific 
                                                             
25 De Vos “What powers and rights does Zuma have to sack members of his Cabinet?” 
https://ww.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-03-29-what-powers-and-rights-does-zuma-have-to-
sack-members-of-his-cabinet/ (26-10-2018). 
26 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992. 
27 Stiftung “The structure of the Ghanaian State” https://www.fesghana.org (16-04-2019). 
28 Dzawu “Ghana energy Minister fired due to power deal, says presidency” 
https://www.google.co.za/amp/s/wwwbbomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2018-08-07/ghana-energy-
minister-fired-due-to-power-deal-says-presidency (06-05-2019). 
29 Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia 1900. 
30 PEO “Separation of powers: parliament, executive and judiciary” https://www.peo.gov.au/learning/fact-
sheets/separation-of-[pwers.html (16-04-2019). 
31 Farnsworth “What happened?” https://whitlamdismissal.com/what-happened (06-05-2019). 
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provisions of the Constitution The right to just administrative action is one of the 
constitutional constraints on the exercise of public power. 32  Section 33 of the 
Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Legislation had to be enacted to give effect 
to this right. The legislation in this regard is the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (hereon referred to as PAJA).33 Therefore any administrative action in terms of 
PAJA is subject to judicial review. PAJA expressly excludes executive authority from 
its scope of application. However non-administrative actions are provided for by the 
Constitution.34 Therefore, the rule of law, which is considered to be one of the values 
upon which the country is founded, is applicable here. Furthermore in terms of the 
rule of law, any law or conduct, which is inconsistent with the Constitution, is 
unlawful. The principle of legality is an aspect of the rule of law. Therefore executive 
decisions can be judicially reviewed in terms of the principle of legality. 35  The 
principle of legality regulates the exercise of all public powers. 36 Therefore the 
exercise of any public power will only be considered legitimate if it is lawful.37 
Moreover, the legality principle is considered to be less invasive method of judicial 
review that the judicial review of administrative law.38 
 
In Minister of Defence & Military Veterans v Motau and Others,39 the court had to 
make a distinction between administrative action and executive action and further 
decide whether the Minister’s decision amounts to administrative action or executive 
action.40 The court held that if it amounts to administrative action, it is subject to a 
higher level of scrutiny in terms of PAJA. It was further held in this case that if it is 
executive action, it is subject to a lower level of scrutiny in terms of the constraints 
imposed by the principle of legality.41 The exercise of a power by a President or 
Premiers to appoint and dismiss must be lawful and rational.42 
 
In Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of health and Others,43 the court 
held that the exercise of public power must be in line with the Constitution which is 
the supreme law of the country and the doctrine of legality which is part of that law. 
The court in this case went further to say that “the doctrine of legality, which is an 
incident of the rule of law, is one of the constitutional controls through which the 
                                                             
32 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) at para172. 
33 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
34 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 121. 
35 Sewpersadh (n 6) 202. 
36 Hoexter (n 34) 122. 
37 Hoexter (n 34) 122. 
38 Konstant “Administrative action, the principle of legality and deference – the case of minister of defence 
and military veterans v motau” 2015 Constitutional Court Review 68 90. 
39 Minister of Defence & Military Veterans v Motau and Others (n 3). 
40 Minister of Defence & Military Veterans v Motau and Others (n 3) par 27. 
41 Minister of Defence & Military Veterans v Motau and Others (n 3) par 27. 
42 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
43 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC).  
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exercise of public power is regulated by the Constitution”. 44  In the case of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex 
parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,45 (hereon referred to as 
the Pharmaceutical case) the court held that it is a required requirement of the rule of 
law that the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries should 
not be arbitrary.46 Therefore from the abovementioned case law, one can deduce that 
the Premier and the President have to act in a non-arbitrary manner. There is a test for 
rationality that courts have developed which will be discussed below 
 
Furthermore if executive decisions made by the President and the Premier to appoint 
and dismiss Members of the Executive are irrational, these decisions should be 
subject to judicial review. Sewpersadh and Mubangizi in their article say that the 
Judiciary when reviewing executive decisions, should exercise this power with great 
caution to ensure that they do not end up exercising the powers of the Executive and 
thus defeat the doctrine of the separation of powers.47 
 
2.2.1 The legality principle 
The principle of legality is an aspect of the rule of law and an underlying principle in 
the Constitution. The Constitution requires that the exercise of all powers must be 
lawful. This principle regulates the exercise of all public power.48 Hoexter is of the 
view that the principle of legality serves as guidelines for the judicial review powers 
of our courts. Hoexter goes further to say that the courts serve to remind the 
Executive that it does not have a free hand to do as it pleases without regard to the 
Constitution. The Executive arm of government is not immune from judicial review 
despite that the action is not administrative in nature.49 Furthermore the principle of 
legality is thought to extend the review powers of the courts.50 Therefore the legality 
principle is considered to be a safety net as it allows for the judicial review of non-
administrative matter such as executive decisions.51 This principle ensures that the 
President and Premier when making decisions act in line with the Constitution and do 
not misconstrue their powers.52 
 
                                                             
44 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of health and Others (n 44). 
45 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
46 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (n 45) par 20. 
47 Sewpersadh (n 6) 202. 
48 Hoexter “The principle of legality in South African administrative law” 2004 Macquarie Law Journal 165. 
49 Hoexter (n 48) 165. 
50 Hoexter (n 48) 165. 
51 Hoexter (n 34) 124. 
52 52 Kruger (n 22) 472. 
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It was in the case of Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg 
Transtional Metropolitan Council and Others (hereafter referred to as the Fedsure 
case),53 that the court first identified the principle of legality and set out that its part of 
the rule of law. The court in this case held that “the exercise of all public power is 
only legitimate if it is lawful”.54 In the case of the President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others,55 the court 
developed the legality principle further and added two elements to it. 56  The two 
elements were that the President had to act in good faith and must not misconstrue his 
or her powers.57  
 
Therefore from the abovementioned cases, one can deduce that the decisions taken by 
the President and the Premiers to appoint and dismiss Members of the Executive is 
executive in nature as opposed to administrative. Their decisions are reviewable in 
terms of the Constitution and specifically the rule of law. As seen in the Fedsure case, 
these powers have to be lawful in order for them to be legitimate in our democratic 
dispensation. Furthermore when the President and Premiers make these decisions, 
they should act in good faith and not misconstrue their powers. Therefore one can 
deduce that if in the appointment and dismissal decisions are not made in good faith 
or are indicative that the President or the Premiers are misconstruing their powers, 
then it will not pass constitutional muster and is therefore reviewable by the courts. 
This meaning that some dismissals of Members of the Executive on a national and 
provincial level can be reviewed if the decisions leading to their appointment or 
dismissal was unlawful or not done in good faith or indicates a misconstrue of 
powers.  
 
2.2.2 The rationality principle 
The exercise of public power must always be rational otherwise it is considered 
unlawful and therefore subject to judicial review. In the case of Merafong 
Demarcation Forum v President of the RSA,58 the court set the standard of rationality 
and stated that the exercise of public power has to be rational. In a constitutional state 
arbitrariness or the exercise of public power on the basis of naked preferences cannot 
pass constitutional muster.59 In the Pharmaceutical case, although the President’s 
                                                             
53 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). 
54 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
(n 53). 
55 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 
(1) SA 1 (CC) at para 148. 
56 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (n 55) 
par 148. 
57 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (n 55) 
par 148. 
58 Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the RSA 2000 (10) BCLR 968 (CC). 
59 Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the RSA (n 58). 
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decision did not constitute administrative action, there were constraints imposed by 
the Constitution. One of these are the rationality principle which is described as a 
“minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise of all public power”.60 
The court explained that it is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of 
public powers by the Executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. 
Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given; 
otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. If 
decisions comply with this requirement, then it passes constitutional scrutiny.61 The 
question whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given calls for an objective enquiry.62 
 
In Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the Constitutional 
Court held that procedural fairness is a requirement of rationality.63 This case had to 
do with the President’s prerogative to pardon offenders. The court held that it would 
be irrational for the President to exercise this prerogative without hearing the people 
affected by the offences committed.64 Therefore the rationality principle requires the 
President or the Premiers to consider all the procedural requirements applicable to the 
circumstances before exercising their prerogative. Ngcobo J in the minority judgment 
of the Masethla case, states that the rationality principle which is also an aspect of the 
rule of law, has both a procedural and a substantive component.65 In addition to the 
abovementioned Yacoob ADCJ held that the “rule that executive decisions may be set 
aside only if they are irrational and may not ordinarily be set aside because they are 
merely unreasonable or procedurally unfair has been adopted precisely to ensure that 
the principle of the separation of powers is respected and given full effect.66 Therefore 
executive decisions are not easily set aside. 
 
The importance of the rationality principle is seen in the development of the South 
African system of constitutional review.67 Hoexter is of the view that the rationality 
principle should only be applied in certain instances. These instances include 
instances when no other ground of review is applicable. However Hoexter emphasizes 
the principle of legality as a residual ground of review. Hoexter goes further to 
                                                             
60 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (n 45) par 90. 
61 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (n 45) par 85. 
62 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (n 45) at par 86. 
63 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). 
64  Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (n 63). 
65 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (n 32). 
66 Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
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African jurisprudence in the light of the separation of powers (2016 thesis SA) 4.  
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emphasize what was said in the Pharmaceutical case about the rationality test being a 
minimum threshold requirement for the exercise of public power.68 
 
Therefore from the abovementioned position one can deduce that the principle of 
rationality is also a ground for constitutional review. This means that the President 
and the Premiers when making decisions will have to act in a rational manner. This 
meaning that they should not misconstrue the powers they exercise. If the decisions 
made by the President or the Premiers are irrational then in terms of the Constitution 
and its rationality principle, the decisions can be reviewed. Therefore if the decision 
to appoint and dismiss Members of the Executive is irrational, it is reviewable by our 
courts. Therefore it is important that when exercising this constitutional power 
afforded to the President and the Premiers that it is done in a non-arbitrary manner. 
However the scope of review afforded by the principle of legality is broad and is 
preferable as it is simple to apply.  
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CHAPTER 3:  THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 AND ITS 
PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS AGAINST UNFAIR DISMISSALS  
3.1 Protective provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Section 23 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to fair labour 
practices. The rest of the subsections refer to workers, employers, employers’ 
organisations and trade unions. In the case of Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele and 
Others (hereon referred to as the Wyeth case),69 the court held that the LRA must be 
construed to give effect to the Constitution.70 Ngcobo J in his judgment said it must 
be stressed that we are dealing with a statute, which was enacted to give effect to 
section 23 of the Constitution, and as such it must be purposively construed.71 The 
Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd and Others  
held,72 that when such legislation has been enacted it is ordinarily impermissible for a 
litigant to base a claim directly on the Constitution without alleging that the statute in 
question is inadequate in the remedies it provides and that the particular constitutional 
right is thereby unduly limited.73  The Constitution and labour legislation seek to 
redress the power imbalance between employers and employees in the country. 
However in terms of the LRA, only “employees” have protection of the law whereas 
in terms of the Constitution, everyone has the right to fair labour practices. There is an 
obligation of fairness on the employer towards his or her employees, which is 
imposed by the law and the Constitution.74 In National Education Health & Allied 
Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others,75 the court held that “since 
‘fair labour practice’ involves a value judgment based on specific circumstances it is 
neither necessary no desirable to define this concept”.76  
The LRA regulates the protection of employees. It regulates the unfair dismissals and 
unfair labour practices in the work place. The most important section in this Act is 
section 213, which defines an employee for purposes of this Act. Employment 
contracts outside the scope of the LRA, are also subject to constitutional scrutiny.77 A 
contract of employment is not solely a commercial contract. Vettori is of the view that 
there is an aspect of the contract that is linked to the person’s human dignity and 
identity.78 These are constitutionally protected rights. In terms of the LRA, a dismissal 
is fair if it is based on misconduct, incapacity or operational reasons. Section 185 of 
                                                             
69 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele and Others (n 4). 
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74 Abrahams, Calitz, Chicktay, Cohen, Dupper, Fergus, Mohammed, Pillay and Qotoyi Labour Law in 
Context (2017) 15. 
75 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (n 71) 
76 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (n 71) 
77 Murray v Minister of Defence (2006) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA). 
78 Vettori “The role of human dignity in the assessment of fair compensation for unfair dismissals” 2012 PER 
102 103. 
 
 
19 
this Act stipulates that every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. 
Section 192 of the LRA sets out the burden of proof for ordinary dismissal cases.79 
 
 3.1.1 Defining an employee 
 
Three main sources of law namely the Constitution, labour legislation as well as the 
law of contract regulate the employment relationship. 80  In terms of the LRA, 
employees have the right to fair labour practices. Section 213 (a) and section 213 (b) 
of the LRA define who an employee is. In terms of the former, it is any person, 
excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State 
and who receives, or is entitled to receive any remuneration. In terms of the latter, it is 
any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business 
of any employer. The latter part of the definition widens the scope of the definition. 
However the definition of an employee in terms of the LRA is narrow.81The LRA is 
applicable to every employee and the only exclusions are members of the National 
Defence Force and members of the State Security Agency.82 Therefore if the Act does 
not cover a person such as a soldier or a spy who is not an employee in terms of the 
LRA, then they can use section 23 of the Constitution, which provides for everyone. 
The Constitutional Court confirmed this position in the case of South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence.83 
 
It is important to distinguish between an employee and an independent contractor. 
This is of critical importance as independent contractors are not protected by the 
LRA.84  There are various tests that exist today that determine whether person is 
considered to be an employee or an independent contractor. These tests include the 
control test, organisation test and the dominant impression test. The control test 
recognizes that there is an exercise of control by the employer over employees. In 
terms of this test and in the case of MECs, the court will take into consideration that 
there is an exercise of control by the President or Premiers over the MECs as they 
appoint and assign powers to these MECs. Therefore for purposes of this test, MECs 
would be considered employees. The organisation test investigates whether a person 
forms part of the employer’s organization. In terms of this test the MECs on a 
national and provincial level form part of the President’s and Premiers’ cabinet. 
Therefore for purposes of this test MECs would be considered employees. The 
dominant impression test determines the nature of the relationship and considers the 
                                                             
79 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
80 Abrahams (n 74) 25. 
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main impression left by the contract and working relationship. In terms of this test, 
the nature of the relationship between the MECs and the President and or Premiers is 
an employment relationship. Therefore for purposes of this test, MECs would be 
considered employees. 
 
In the case of South African Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie (hereafter referred 
to as the McKenzie case), 85 the court discussed several factors in which one could use 
to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. The 
Labour Appeals Court in this case said that an employee is paid a salary whereas a 
freelancer (independent contractor) is paid a fee for performing a specific task. The 
court in this case further said that an employee is entitled to sick leave where as an 
independent contractor is not. This court also held that some important characteristics 
of the contract of employment and the contract of work are that an employee renders 
personal services where as an independent contractor performs specified work. 
Therefore in terms of this test, one can deduce that MECs render services to the 
President and Premiers. This is in line with their portfolios.  In the McKenzie case, the 
court held amongst other factors that employees are paid a salary and they render 
personal services. MECs get paid a salary and render the services assigned to them by 
the President and Premiers. Therefore these are factors in terms of this 
abovementioned McKenzie case that can lead one to deduce that MECs are 
employees. The Labour Appeals Court in another case also had to decide the same 
thing based on several factors. One of them being whether there was any exercise of 
control, which would indicate an employer and employee relationship. Therefore in 
this instance the control exercised by the President and Premiers over the MECs 
indicate an employer and employee relationship. 
 
Moreover an employer is defined as “any person that employs or provides work to an 
employee and that remunerates the employee for such services, or permits such an 
employee to assist it in the carrying on or conducting of its business.”86 It is also 
important to note that an employer can be a natural person, a partnership, a company, 
a close corporation or trust.87 
 
In addition, in terms of the common law, the contract of employment is relevant. In 
the Wyeth case, the court held that if a person concludes a contract of employment 
then they are considered to be an employee. In Masetlha v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another, Masoneke held that ‘just because the president has the 
requisite power to make the decision to dismiss and the exercise of that power is in 
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accordance with the law, it does not mean the contract of employment comes to 
naught.’88 He went on further to say that the breakdown of trust in an employment 
relationship is not a sufficient ground to justify a unilateral termination of a contract 
of employment. It would however be relevant for purposes of a remedy.89  
 
From the abovementioned, one can deduce that in order to get protection from the 
provisions of the LRA, one would have to be considered an employee in terms of the 
definition of the LRA. Members of the Executive on a provincial and national level fit 
the definition of an employee in terms of section 213 (a) of the LRA. In terms of 
section 213 (a), Members of the Executive work for the state and receive 
remuneration for it. Therefore one can deduce that for purposes of the LRA, Members 
of the Executive are considered employees and therefore do afford protection that is 
provided by the sections of the LRA against unfair dismissals.  
 
3.1.2 Unfair dismissals  
 
According to the common law, only employees can be dismissed.90 Dismissal in its 
simplest form means the employer has ended the job contract.91 The law that regulates 
unfair dismissals is the LRA read with the applicable Codes of Good Conduct issued 
in terms of the Act.92 An organisation named NEDLAC published the Code of Good 
Practice for dismissals, which serves as a guideline to employees, and employers for 
dismissals. It is important to note that NEDLAC is the same organisation that drafted 
the LRA.93 Section 186 (1) (a) of the LRA sets out the main definition of a dismissal 
as termination of employment with or without notice. 94  Section 185 of the LRA 
stipulates that everyone has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.95 In Ouwehand v 
Hout Bay Fishing Industries, the Labour Court held that the onus is on the employee 
to prove some overt act by the employer that was the proximate cause of termination 
of employment.96 An employee aggrieved by conduct of an employer, therefore, must 
in the first instance seek a remedy in terms of the relevant statute.97 Dismissals should 
always be procedurally and substantively fair.98 Section 188 (1) of the LRA sets out 
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that a dismissal will only be fair if it is motivated by a fair reason and was done in 
accordance with fair procedure.99 It is important to note that section 188 applies to all 
workers regardless of the length of service.100 In terms of the LRA, a dismissal is fair 
if it is based on misconduct, incapacity or operational reasons. In Council for 
Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen,101 the court held that breach of trust is a 
sufficient ground for an employer to dismiss an employee even if that breach falls 
short of being misconduct.102 Other reasons such as negligence and non-disclosure of 
previous misconduct are sufficient to dismiss.103 
 
The main aim of the doctrine of unfair dismissals is to protect an employee against a 
substantively or procedurally unfair dismissal.104  There are four requirements that 
have to be met in a case that deals with an alleged unfair dismissal. This is substantive 
fairness, procedural fairness, the dismissal is in compliance with the definition of a 
dismissal in the LRA and the person is an employee as defined by the LRA.105 
Substantive fairness refers to the actual reason why the employee was dismissed.106 
Oosthuizen is of the view that substantive fairness is not only about evaluating the 
reason for dismissal but also looking whether the employer imposed a reasonable 
sanction.107 Procedural fairness refers to the process applied when the employee was 
dismissed.108 In Avril Elizabeth Home for the Handicapped v CCMA, the Labour 
Court held that procedural fairness means “no more than that there should be dialogue 
and an opportunity for reflection before any decision is taken to dismiss”.109 There are 
certain procedural requirements that need to be met in order for the dismissal to be 
considered procedurally fair. For example, in the case of misconduct, once a 
complaint is put forward it should be investigated. It is also a general requirement that 
before an employee is dismissed, he or she must have received a warning.110 
 
Furthermore it is important to note that there is a burden of proof in dismissal cases 
on both the employee and employer. Section 192 of the LRA sets out the burden of 
proof for ordinary dismissal cases. In terms of this burden, the employee has to prove 
that there was a dismissal on a balance of probabilities. Once the dismissal has been 
proven, the burden then moves to the employer who has to prove that the dismissal is 
                                                             
99 n 79 above. 
100 Smit and Van Eck ”International perspectives on South Africa’s unfair dismissal law” 2010 Research Gate 
46 62. 
101 1996 (2) SA 1 (A). 
102 Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen (n 101). 
103 Nagel (n103) 658. 
104 Nagel (n103) 657. 
105 Nagel (n 103) 657. 
106 Nagel (n 103) 658. 
107 Oosthuizen “Unfair dismissals- individual cases”1991 South African Human Rights Year Book 382 384. 
108 Nagel (n 103)658. 
109 Avril Elizabeth Home for the Handicapped v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 1466 (LC). 
110 Nagel (n 103) 658. 
 
 
23 
fair.  To this end, the employer is required to prove that the dismissal was effected for 
a fair reason following a fair procedure.111 The remedy offered to an employee who 
has been unfairly dismissed is re-employment, reinstatement and compensation. 
These remedies are capped at a maximum of twelve months.  
 
Employees who wish to challenge the fairness of their dismissals should, as a rule, 
make use of internal remedies before raising a claim under the LRA.112 An unfair 
dismissal dispute must be referred to the CCMA or to a bargaining council having 
jurisdiction.113 If conciliation fails then the depending on the nature of the dispute, it 
may be referred for arbitration to the CCMA or for adjudication to the Labour 
Court.114 The dispute must be referred to the CCMA if the reasons for dismissal were 
misconduct, incapacity, unfavorable working conditions or the employee is unaware 
of the reasons.115 The dispute must be referred to the Labour Court if the employee 
alleges the dismissal was automatically unfair or was due to the employer’s 
operational requirements.116 
 
The LRA in section 193 sets out the remedies the Labour Court or an arbitrator have 
available in an unfair dismissal dispute. These are reinstatement, reemployment or 
compensation. Reinstatement and reemployment are considered the primary remedies. 
Therefore these remedies have to be ordered unless the employee does not want to be 
reinstated or reemployed or if the employee feels as though a continued employment 
relationship would not be feasible and it would be intolerable.117 The other exceptions 
are if it is not feasible or possible for the employer to reemploy or reinstate the 
employee and lastly if the dismissal is unfair because procedural reasons.118 In the 
case where one of the abovementioned exceptions are proved on a balance of 
probabilities, reinstatement or reemployment may not be ordered.119 Reinstatement 
aims to reverse the wrong of the unfair dismissal and further aims to put the employee 
in the exact position he or she was in before the dismissal. 120  The award of 
reinstatement or reemployment may be made retrospective. 121  In cases where 
reemployment or reinstatement is not feasible, the court or the arbitrator can order 
compensation.122 
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Moreover, from the abovementioned discussion on employees, one can deduce that 
because Members of the Executive are employees for purposes of the LRA, they do 
get protection against unfair dismissals in terms of the LRA. This meaning that their 
dismissals would have to be considered substantively and procedurally fair in terms of 
the provisions of the LRA. The main reasons for dismissal are operational 
requirements, misconduct and incapacity. If the dismissal is not because of anyone 
one of these reasons, then it is considered unfair and therefore remedies are available. 
The three main remedies a court or an arbitrator can award would be re-employment, 
reinstatement and compensation. As is the case in a dismissal, the dismissed Member 
of the Executive would have to prove is that there was a dismissal. The employer, 
which is the President or the Premier, in this case then bears the burden to prove that 
it is a fair dismissal and that it was a substantively and procedurally fair dismissal. 
Therefore one can see that there is and should be recourse provided to the Members of 
the Executive that are unfairly dismissed. The LRA should apply to Members of the 
Executive. 
 
3.2 Law versus reality 
The President and the Provincial Premiers have a constitutional power, which allows 
them to appoint and dismiss Members of the Executive on a national and provincial 
level. This is considered to be an executive decision, which is not reviewable in terms 
of PAJA. However it is reviewable in terms of the Constitution and specifically the 
rule of law. The principle of legality is applicable in this case. This principle ensures 
that the President and the Premiers do not abuse the constitutional prerogative they 
have. It does this by stipulating that all public powers exercised should be lawful. It 
further does this by stipulating that when the President and the Premiers exercise a 
public power such as the one to appoint and dismiss Members of the Executive, they 
should do this in good faith and in a way that will not result in a misconstrue of 
powers. Therefore if an appointment or a dismissal results in the infringement of the 
legality principle, it is then judicially reviewable.   
 
Members of the Executive on a national and provincial level meet the requirements to 
be considered employees for purposes of the LRA and therefore should afford 
protection by the provisions against unfair dismissals. Therefore the dismissal would 
have to be due to a fair reason, which is usually misconduct, incapacity, or operational 
reasons. The dismissal must be substantively and procedurally fair. Therefore if it is 
not for one of these three reasons, the Member of the Executive is then entitled to 
protection in terms of the LRA against unfair dismissals. The relief that can be sought 
in this instance is reinstatement, re-employment or compensation.  
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However the reality faced in South Africa is different from what the position in the 
law sets out. It is so common for a cabinet reshuffle to occur at any time and for the 
Members of the Executive currently employed to be replaced by new appointments. 
This results in some Members of the Executive losing their jobs. There is no security 
for them keeping a job as it is the discretion of the President and the Premiers to 
appoint and dismiss them as they deem fit. An example is during Jacob Zuma’s term 
of presidency where he replaced the Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Nene with Des Van 
Rooyen, which resulted in a compromise of the country’s economy.123 Therefore this 
is a problem as it raises some constitutional concerns. Therefore political 
considerations should not trump constitutional considerations.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
4.1 Brief overview of the Bill of Rights and its application 
In the Pharmaceutical case, it was held that there is only one system of law and it is 
shaped by the Constitution, which is the supreme law.124 The most critical rules that 
govern the South African political system are enshrined in the Constitution.125 Section 
7(1) of the Constitution sets out that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy 
in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. It protects the rights of the 
people in the country and sets out their obligations.126 It also sets out the institutions 
of South Africa and what powers they have and the manner in which those powers 
must be exercised.127 In terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the state must 
‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ the rights in the Bill of Rights. Therefore this is 
a state duty. If the state fails to comply with this duty, it is considered to be acting in 
an unconstitutional manner. This meaning its actions or laws will be considered 
unlawful.128 In the Pharmaceutical case, the Constitutional Court also held that all 
law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject 
to constitutional control.129 
 
Furthermore section 8(1) of the Constitution sets out that the Bill of Rights applies to 
all law and binds the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary and all organs of state. 
This shows that in South Africa no one is above the law. Similarly there is no sphere 
of government above the law. Section 7(3) of the Constitution further sets out that the 
rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in 
section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill. It is important to note that no right is absolute. It 
is also very important that South Africans are informed about the Constitution and 
what it encompasses.130 
4.2 Right to fair labour practices versus right to appoint and dismiss 
 
   4.2.1 Right to fair labour practices and the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
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Section 23(1) of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to fair labour 
practices. This is a very broad and inclusive right. Respect for human dignity, equality 
and freedom are repeatedly emphasized in the Bill of Rights. 131  The Wiehahn 
commission introduced the ‘unfair labour practices’ idea in 1979. This was 
considered to include unfair dismissals, failure to renew fixed contract, selective 
reemployment and discrimination. 132  Many of these form part of the LRA. 
Discrimination is no longer considered an unfair labour practice. The EEA deals with 
it extensively.133 Section 186(2) of the LRA deals with unfair labour practices and 
sets out that it is considered to be any unfair act or omission that arises between an 
employer and an employee. It is only an employee that can allege an unfair labour 
practice.  In the National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of 
Cape Town case, it was held that although the conduct of an employee can result in an 
unfair labour practice, the employer has other remedies available.134  
 
Furthermore the Labour Court held that section 186 (2) of the LRA was a closed list 
of factors. 135  Therefore one can see that the fair labour practice definition as 
envisioned in the Constitution is broad and provides more protection. Therefore there 
is interplay between the LRA and the Constitution. In NAPTOSA and Others v 
Minister of Education Western, Western Cape Government and Others (hereon 
referred to as the NAPTOSA case), the High Court held that direct reliance on the 
Constitution should be avoided as it would lead to two streams of jurisprudence.136 It 
was also held in the NAPTOSA case that where there is no specific remedy in the 
LRA, nothing prevents the employee from relying directly on the constitutional right 
to fair labour practices.137 As seen in the Wyeth case, the LRA was enacted to give 
effect to section 23.138 The right not to be unfairly dismissed is afforded to employees 
by section 185 of the LRA. Therefore this right is protected by the LRA. This was 
confirmed in the case of Janda v First National Bank.139 
 
 4.2.2 Right to appoint and dismiss 
Section 91(2) of the Constitution gives the President a constitutional right to appoint 
and dismiss Ministers and Deputy Ministers. The Premier similarly appoints and 
dismisses the MECs. Section 132 (2) of the Constitution sets out that the Premier 
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assigns powers to these members. The abovementioned decisions made by the 
President and Premiers do not have to be made in consultation with any members. 
However it is also important to consider that constitutional rights are not absolute.140 
The President and Premiers’ decision to appoint or dismiss MECs on a national or 
provincial level is an exercise of public power, which has to be in line with the 
Constitution.141 Any decision that is not in line with the Constitution is considered not 
to pass constitutional muster. 
 
In the Pharmaceutical case, the Constitutional Court held that “it is a requirement of 
the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive and other 
functionaries should not be arbitrary”.142 This in essence is the principle of legality. 
This principle of legality is an aspect of the rule of law. This principle regulates the 
exercise of all public power.143 Therefore this means that the exercise of all powers 
must be lawful. This also means that the decisions the President and Premiers make to 
appoint and dismiss are in essence an exercise of a public power and must not be 
arbitrary. A decision which is arbitrary in nature is subject to judicial review. 
 
4.3 Weighing up of conflicting constitutional rights 
The weighing up of conflicting constitutional rights means there has been a limitation 
of a constitutional right. Currie and De Waal are of the view that a limitation is 
synonymous of an infringement or a justifiable infringement.144Therefore this means 
that some rights may be justifiably infringed but for a very exceptionally strong 
reason.145 Therefore the general limitation clause under section 36 of the Constitution 
is relevant here. It is important to note what was held in the S v Zuma case,146 that the 
“Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean”.147 The general 
limitation clause is part of the Constitution. This general limitation clause allows 
constitutionally protected rights to be limited for a ‘certain democratically justifiable 
purpose’.148 In S v Manamela,149 it was held that “a law that limits rights should not 
use a sledgehammer to crack a nut”.150 
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Section 36(1) of the Constitution sets out that rights may only be limited in terms the 
law of general application. This includes common law and statutory law. Limitations 
must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. In order to determine this, there are certain factors the 
court must consider in determining whether a limitation of a right is constitutional.151 
These factors include the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation and the nature and extent of the limitation. Moreover the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.152 
 
There is a two-stage approach, which the Constitutional Court uses. The first stage is 
an interpretation stage only.153  Therefore this deals mainly with the determination of 
the scope of the right.154 In the first stage, the court must determine whether the 
impugned provision limits a constitutional right. If that’s the case then the second 
approach must be determined. In the second stage, the court determines whether the 
limitation of the right is justifiable in terms of the limitation clause.155 This is done by 
considering the factors in terms of section 36 to see whether the limitation is 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.156 This two-stage approach was confirmed in the Constitutional Court.157 
Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus states that an assessment of competing values will 
necessarily occur at both stages.158 In S v Manamela, it was held that “the more 
serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the 
justification must be”.159 Moreover it is important to note Rautenbach’s view that 
“proportionality is a prominent feature of the application of the limitation clause in 
the South African Constitution”.160 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Meyerson is of the view that the Constitutional Court does not take rights seriously.161 
Meyerson is also of the view that the “rights are a card of a stronger suit than the 
general good and the fact that the exercise of a right is not in the public interest is not 
enough to justify interference with that right”. 162  Meyerson however does 
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acknowledge that rights are not absolute. The President’s and Premiers’ right to 
appoint and dismiss does infringe on the MECs right to unfair dismissal especially if 
it is in pursuit of a political agenda. Therefore there is a limitation in this instance. In 
this instance, the first stage of the two stage approach courts developed to test whether 
a limitation is justifiable is satisfied. The second stage is to determine whether the 
limitation is justifiable in terms of the factors in section 36 (1)(a)-(e) of the 
Constitution. 
 
The first factor in terms of section 36(1) (a) of the Constitution is the nature of the 
right. The nature of the right in section 23 of the Constitution is to protect employees 
from unfair treatment in the workplace. Therefore in turn employees are protected 
from unfair dismissals in terms of legislation enacted to give effect to section 23 of 
the Constitution. The second factor in terms of section 36 (1) (b) is the importance of 
the purpose. The limitation must advance an important state interest.163 Furthermore a 
dismissal of an MEC to ensure the effective business of government is a justifiable 
limitation. However the limitation in the case of the President and Premiers’ choice to 
appoint and dismiss MECs tends not to only be a political consideration but the 
pursuit of a personal political agenda. In this instance, this is not a very important 
purpose especially if it is to pursue a personal political agenda as political 
considerations should be to the benefit of the country and its’ citizens and not specific 
individuals in power. However if a dismissal were due to a legally sound reason such 
as misconduct, then it would be justifiable as it would be for a good purpose. When 
the Constitutional Court considers this factor, they speak of a balancing act. 164 
Therefore the section 23 right is of critical importance and MECs when dismissed 
should be dismissed in a substantively and procedurally fair manner. Usually if one 
factor fails then the courts do not have to continue the inquiry. It is usually concluded 
that the limitation is not justifiable.165 
 
Nevertheless if one were to continue the inquiry, it would be to determine the third 
factor in terms of section 36 (1) (c ) of the Constitution. This is the nature and extent 
of the limitation. The manner in which the President’s and Premiers’ decision to 
appoint and dismiss limits the MECs section 23 right is negative as it could leave 
MECs without a job whenever the President and Premiers deems fit as it is their 
constitutional prerogative to do so. This means that in reality the MECs do not afford 
protection by labour legislation especially the LRA. In everyday life, it takes even a 
cabinet reshuffle for MECs to be left without a job. This highlights the vulnerability 
of the MECs as their employment depends on the President and Premiers decisions. 
From the abovementioned discussion on section 36 (1)© of the Consitution, one can 
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deduce that in this instance the limitation is not justifiable and already wont pass 
constitutional muster. Moreover if one were to continue the inquiry further in terms of 
section 36 (1) (d) of the Constitution this would mean to determine the relationship 
between the limitation and the purpose of the limitation. Here the court needs to 
consider whether the purpose of the limitation, regardless of its importance is 
reasonably related to the means used to achieve that purpose.166 The purpose of the 
limitation of the rights of the MECs is to pursue a political agenda, which is related to 
the decision to appoint or dismiss them. Therefore because there is a link, the next 
factor would need to be considered.  
 
The last factor the Court needs to consider in terms of section 36 (1) (e) of the 
Constitution is to determine whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. The purpose is to pursue a political agenda in most cases. In this instance, 
the continuous employment of MECs on a national and a provincial level,  this may 
not necessarily suit the President’s or Premiers’ political preference at the time. 
However this does not mean that it should leave MECs in a vulnerable position of 
being dismissed at any time. The less restrictive means would be trying to make sure 
the political agenda is lawful and to then impose it on the MECs. This could easily be 
done if good relationships are formed. However the political agenda should ideally be 
to the benefit of South African citizens.  
 
Consequently from the abovementioned inquiry, one can deduce that if a dismissal of 
an MEC were done in order to pursue a political agenda, it would not be justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The 
section 23 right should not be limited because of a political agenda. At the end of the 
day, although MECs exercise a public power, they are still entitled to protection of the 
law. Therefore all the labour legislations that regulate employment relationships 
should apply to them as well. Therefore they should afford protection against unfair 
dismissals in terms of the LRA. This meaning that if they are to be dismissed, the 
dismissal should be substantively and procedurally fair. Therefore if their rights were 
to be limited, it should be in terms of the general limitation clause in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution. If it does not satisfy the provisions of the general limitation 
clause then it is not considered to be a justifiable reason. The President and the 
Premiers should start treating MECs on a provincial and national level in a more 
human like manner and protect and fulfill their right to fair labour practices in terms 
of section 23 of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS  
From all that was mentioned in the previous chapters, one can deduce that there needs 
to be certain measures put into place to ensure that MECs on a national or provincial 
level are protected by the law and are protected against unfair dismissals. This has to 
be the case even though it is the President’s and Premiers’ constitutional prerogative 
to appoint and dismiss MECs as they deem fit. There are certain measures that can be 
taken to ensure that the MECs are not put in a vulnerable position because of this 
constitutional prerogative.  
 
The first measure that can be taken is to amend the LRA definition of an “employee” 
to include Members of the Executive Council. Therefore this means that it should be 
expressly indicated that MECs are employees. This should be done even if it means 
adding a further subsection to the definition of an employee in the LRA. This 
meaning that if MECs were dismissed, it should be for substantively and procedurally 
fair reasons. This would then mean if MECs were unfairly dismissed and the 
President or Premiers do not have an intention of reinstating the MEC in question, 
then that person would have a right to compensation not more than twelve months 
remuneration. Nonetheless it is important to note that in unfair dismissal disputes, 
compensation is a last resort remedy. Reinstatement is considered to be the primary 
remedy in unfair dismissal disputes.167 
 
The second measure that can be taken is to have legislation that puts some restrictions 
on the President and Premiers’ constitutional prerogative to appoint and dismiss 
MECs. An example of a restriction would be that the prerogative of the President or 
Premiers can be limited if it is to advance the best interests of South African citizens 
or the economy. The third measure is to have a law that if an MEC is dismissed 
without a fair reason such as a cabinet reshuffle, then that decision to dismiss the 
MEC in question is reviewable by the Labour Court within thirty days from the 
dismissal date. The Labour Court should follow the general limitation clause two-
stage approach, which is in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution. The fourth 
measure that can be taken is to entrench the right to unfair dismissals in the 
Constitution. The section 23 right to fair labour practices is not enough to cover unfair 
dismissals especially in cases where MECs are involved. The fifth measure is that 
there should be requirements MECs should comply with before being appointed. 
There should have a certain level of qualification, the necessary skills to perform 
ministerial skills and the necessary experience in the field. Furthermore there should 
be a Code of Practice that states what the procedure for appointments and dismissals 
is. This will bring about legal certainty. There should also be a Code of Ethics for 
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Members of the Cabinet and Members of the Executive Councils that is followed. 
This should be read in line with the Executive Members’ Ethics Act.168 
 
Furthermore there should be a provision in the Executive Members Ethics Act that 
limits the constitutional prerogative of the President and Premiers in that if any of the 
members they have appointed are in breach of the code of ethics, that that is a ground 
for dismissal. This is very important because neither the Constitution nor the 
Executive Members Ethics Act obliges the President or the Premiers to dismiss MECs 
that are in breach of the code of ethics.169 Another measure is to relook at what is 
considered rational in terms of the President and Premiers decision to appoint and 
dismiss. As de Vos suggests in his article, these decisions could be politically driven 
and considered rational. An example was even made that a member of the Executive 
can be dismissed just based on them not being in a faction within a political party and 
it will still be regarded rational. There needs to be a standard test for rationality, 
which is specific to those kinds of decisions. A standard of the test should be that the 
decision to appoint or dismiss is made to ensure the effective business of 
government.170This position was set out in the Masetlha case where it was held that 
“the powers to appoint and dismiss are conferred specially upon the President for the 
effective business of government”.171 
 
Moreover there should be a clause in the performance agreement MECs sign that 
stipulates that if they fail to carry out their duties assigned to them then they could be 
dismissed. This would be fair as they are exercising a public power and the 
performance of their duties would help better the interests of South African citizens. 
Furthermore South Africa should have a Minister of Presidency again who monitors 
MECs and has the power to intervene in situations and dismiss if the need arises. The 
Minister of Presidency according to the South African Government News Agency, 
“heads the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation as well as Administration in the 
Presidency which will monitor and evaluate the performance of government in all 
three spheres”. 172 This is essential as there needs to be someone the MECs on a 
national and provincial level are accountable to in the Executive level besides the 
President and the Premiers. Collins Chabane under the Jacob Zuma’s term of 
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presidency served as a Minister of Presidency.173 This form of oversight should be 
reintroduced. 
 
Nonetheless it is important to note that President Cyril Ramaphosa provided clarity in 
his cabinet announcement on the 30th of May 2019 as to how the performance 
agreement would work. He stated that each and every one of the Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers would be signing performance agreements, which will be regularly 
monitored. He further mentioned that where results are unsatisfactory, action would 
be taken.174 This is a good initiative, which will help South African citizens regain 
confidence in the governmental structure. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This study first considered the current position of the South African Executive 
Authority and the judicial review of executive decisions. Secondly, this study 
considered the LRA and its protective provisions against unfair dismissals. This was 
done by way of overview of the concept of an employee. Looking at unfair dismissals 
in great detail further is the manner in which this was done. Thirdly, this study 
explored the conflicting constitutional rights in this instance and how to weigh them 
up in the South African Constitutional law context. Against this background, the 
underlying question of whether the LRA provides proper protection of MECs against 
unfair dismissals was addressed. Lastly, this study provided recommendations for 
MECs to have more protection by the South African legal system when it comes to 
unfair dismissals.  
 
In essence, the reality today is that MECs on a national and provincial level do not 
have protection against unfair dismissals, as they should. They are at the mercy of the 
President and the Premiers when it comes to remaining employed. It is as easy as a 
cabinet reshuffle for them to be left without employment. This study has attempted to 
show that MECs can be considered employees in terms of the LRA and other several 
tests the courts have implemented to determine this. The mere fact that the MECs 
work for the State and under the control of the President and Premiers should be 
sufficient for them to be considered employees in terms of the LRA and therefore 
afford protection of the law against unfair dismissals. This study further shows that if 
this were the case then a cabinet reshuffle leaving an MEC without employment 
would result in an unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA. Therefore they will be 
entitled to one of the remedies under the LRA namely reemployment, reinstatement 
and compensation. Reinstatement is the primary remedy. If this is not possible, then 
they would be entitled to compensation up to twelve months remuneration. Therefore 
it is important that MECs are considered employees for purposes of the LRA. 
 
This study has also attempted to bring Constitutional law in to show that in terms of 
the Constitution, MECs are entitled to the right to fair labour practices and if this right 
were to be limited then it would have to be justifiable in terms of the general 
limitation clause in the Constitution. Therefore the importance of this right is 
emphasized in this study. Furthermore this study has attempted to provide 
recommendations to not leave MECs in a vulnerable position. This is mainly by 
amending the LRA definition of an “employee” to include MECs, even if it meant 
adding a further subsection to the definition. This is also by making sure all MECs 
sign a performance agreement, which is regularly monitored. Furthermore setting a 
new threshold for rationality in terms of the decision to appoint or dismiss MECs 
could do this. This threshold should be that it will be considered rational to dismiss an 
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MEC if it is done to ensure the effective business of government. These are some of 
the ways in which the crisis MECs currently face can be resolved. This vulnerability 
of Ministers is faced in more countries than one would think. 
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